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Abstract: In his target article, Key (2016) reviews the neuroanatomy of human pain and uses 
what is known about human pain to argue that fish cannot experience pain. We provide three 
reasons why the conclusions reached by Key are unsupported. They consider (i) why it is not 
sufficient to conclude that only human neural structures can process conscious pain, (ii) why an 
understanding of pain in humans and non-human animals needs to be based within a framework 
of consciousness, and (iii) evidence already exists that fish treated with noxious stimuli lose the 
ability to perform normal behaviours: This was a behavioral proxy that Key proposed would 
provide good evidence for an animal to feel pain. 
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The target article by Key (2016) is problematic on multiple grounds. First and foremost is the 
assumption that human pain processing is the standard for assessing pain processing in non-
human animals. Yet many, Key included, agree that the process of convergent evolution allows 
different structures to perform the same function, so it is puzzling that Key maintains that only 
human structures can perform the function of conscious pain. 
 
We agree that a central goal in understanding the feeling associated with pain is to determine 
the unique functional properties of consciousness, but to do so requires a theory of 
consciousness, which Key has not articulated, much less defended. In particular, arguments for 
animal consciousness do exist (Droege & Braithwaite, 2014; Edelman & Seth, 2009) and should 
be considered. 
 




Key does an admirable job of articulating current understanding on the neuroanatomy of human 
pain, but he does not acknowledge the ongoing debates regarding the neuroanatomy of human 
consciousness (Block et al., 2014). There are good reasons to believe that global integration and 
attentional amplification are essential elements in consciousness. So the question is not 
whether fish have a cortex or an insula, but whether they have the functional capacity for global 
integration and attentional amplification. Key accuses others of a perfunctory attention to the 
neuroscience of pain, but he demonstrates a perfunctory attention to the neuroscience of fish. 
 
In his conclusion, Key states that innate defensive behaviors cannot be used as a proxy for fish 
pain. Instead, he suggests that a good behavioral assay would involve the loss of a normal 
behavior (such as feeding or locomotion) rather than performance of a reflex behavior (such as 
an escape response). We agree with this conclusion and in fact, such an example has already 
been reported for trout, who show impaired avoidance of a novel object when treated with a 
noxious stimulus but are able to move and stay away from the novel object if given an analgesic 
(Sneddon et al., 2003).  
 
While Key’s conclusion that fish do not feel pain is unsupported, a challenge for animal 
researchers remains: positive evidence through a variety of behavioral measures for the 
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